The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundament
al change in the post-Cold War period, characterized by the growing re
cognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a nee
d for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict
avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of
the US Department of State's 'soft landing' and other engagement polic
ies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some comment
ators have seen the soft-landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to
use its economic power to contribute to regional and international se
curity. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft-
landing policy, how Japanese policy-makers evaluate its potential as a
solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent
of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the limitat
ions of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international res
trictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre,
domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general l
ack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the co
nclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage Nor
th Korea economically, Japanese policy-makers have devoted their energ
ies principally to the redefinition of the US-Japan military alliance
based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.