This article provides an empirical comparison of the level of educatio
n spending under three different institutional structures of spending
control. From least to most centralized, these are local control of sp
ending with overlapping jurisdictions, local control with nonoverlappi
ng jurisdictions, and state (or provincial) control. A model of educat
ion expenditure determination under each regime is derived and estimat
ed (using Canadian data), and spending levels under the three regimes
are simulated and compared. The results indicate that spending behavio
r differs significantly across regimes and that the institutional stru
cture of spending control is an important determinant of the level of
education expenditures. The local control regime with nonoverlapping j
urisdictions yields the lowest level of total education spending, but
the provincial control regime has the lowest operating expenditures. T
he local control regime with overlapping jurisdictions has the highest
level of both total and operating expenditures. These results suggest
that the relationship between decentralization and spending is not ne
cessarily monotonic.