THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE - RELATIVIST ACCUSATIONS, PRAGMATIST AND CRITICAL REALIST RESPONSES

Social constructivists argue that what we call ''nature'' is far less universal and extrahuman than generally assumed. Yet this argument has been vigorously attacked by some natural scientists and other scholar s due to what they perceive as its dangerous flirtation with relativis m. I introduce this debate by reference to a recent controversy over t he concept of wilderness, an important icon of nature in North America . I then define several forms of relativism, and compare two contempor ary bodies of thought that are in broad agreement with social construc tivism, yet do not promote strong forms of relativism: critical realis m and pragmatism. For its part, critical realism is marked by a qualif ied, though vigorous, rejection of strong forms of relativism in under standing nature, whereas pragmatism involves more of an agnostic respo nse, a sense that the so-called problem of relativism is not as seriou s as critics of the social-construction of nature argument would belie ve. Taken together, the two approaches offer more than either one alon e, as they both suggest important truths about nature, albeit,generall y at different scales. Ultimately, pragmatists and critical realists a like admit that all knowledges are partial and a certain degree of rel ativism is thus unavoidable; yet they both, in a sort of tense complem entarity, point to ways that geographers and others whose business and concern it is to represent nature can indeed have something to say.