RESTRICTED ATTENTION, MYOPIC PLAY, AND THE LEARNING OF EQUILIBRIUM

Authors
FLAM SD
Citation
Sd. Flam, RESTRICTED ATTENTION, MYOPIC PLAY, AND THE LEARNING OF EQUILIBRIUM, Annals of operation research, 82, 1998, pp. 473-482
Citations number
18
Categorie Soggetti
Operatione Research & Management Science","Operatione Research & Management Science
Journal title
Annals of operation research → ACNP
ISSN journal
02545330
Volume
82
Year of publication
1998
Pages
473 - 482
Database
ISI
SICI code
0254-5330(1998)82:<473:RAMPAT>2.0.ZU;2-K
Abstract
We consider repeated play of noncooperative games in which agents have more decisions to consider at every stage than their attention allows . Howe:ver, under a monotonicity assumption, if every variable is adju sted cyclically, as guided; by marginal payoffs, then myopic steps lea d to Nash equilibrium in the long run.