This paper describes the Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) method fo
r determining the needed SIL (Safety Integrity Level) of a SIS (Safety
Instrumented System). The paper also shows the relationship of LOPA t
o other analysis methods for safety system requirements. Building on t
he CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) Guidelines for Safe Autom
ation of Chemical Processes, this paper shows how to determine if addi
tional safeguards are needed and how to determine the needed SIL of a
SIS. LOPA is a tool that can be used after the HAZOP (HAZard and OPera
bility Analysis), but before using fault tree analysis or quantitative
risk analysis. Using a multi-disciplined team, the consequences ident
ified in the HAZOP are listed as impact events and are classified for
severity level. The initiating causes are listed for each impact event
and a likelihood is estimated for each initiating cause. Independent
Protection Layers (IPLs) are listed, including process design, basic p
rocess control system, alarms and procedures, safety instrumented syst
ems, and additional mitigation. Each IPL is assigned a Probability of
Failure on Demand (PFD). A mitigated event likelihood is calculated by
multiplying the initiating cause likelihood by the PFDs for the appli
cable IPLs. The mitigated event likelihood is then compared to a crite
rion linked to the corporation's criteria for unacceptable risk levels
. Additional IPLs can be added to reduce the risk. The mitigated event
likelihoods are summed to give an estimate of the risk for the whole
process. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.