Economics can be used to analyze public sector decision making because
individuals make these decisions within a framework of incentives and
constraints that are a product of individual preferences and institut
ional structure. Considering the emphasis an law enforcement in U.S. d
rug policy in this context, this paper presents an analysis of the inc
entives and constraints affecting drug policy that explains a reluctan
ce to change the policy even in the face of considerable evidence that
some reforms could be cost effective. Two specific incentives for an
emphasis on enforcement are presented. First, police agencies have an
incentive to allocate more resources to drug enforcement due to the fa
ctors that determine police budgets. Second, asset forfeiture laws giv
e police agencies a direct monetary reward for making drug arrests. We
conclude that understanding drug policy requires an examination of th
e incentives and constraints that affect the behavior of those who are
responsible for policy development.