This paper analyzes and tests the hypothesis that political and econom
ic equality result in lower levels of environmental degradation. Based
on formal statements of the argument put forward by Boyce, R., 1994,
Ecological Economics, ii, 169-178, I show that equality may or may not
be necessary to minimize degradation. Under some plausible conditions
, greater inequality may even be conducive to lower degradation. Actua
l results depend primarily on the intersection between the distributio
n of preferences across groups and the institutional rules. Two cross-
national empirical tests tend to support the contention that distribut
ional issues do not systematically explain variations in environmental
quality. The results reinforce the conclusion that assumptions about
the structure of preferences and workings of social choice institution
s ignore complex interactions which influence the relationship between
degradation and equality. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights r
eserved.