Binational panels and multilateral negotiations: A two-track approach to limiting contingent protection

Responding to the rise of trade remedy laws as tools of protection in the 1 970's and 1980's, Canada entered into free trade negotiations with the Unit ed States. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, however, did not reform an tidumping and countervailing duty laws. Instead, a new dispute settlement m echanism, binational panels, would provide supranational oversight for agen cy administration of trade remedy laws. Canada thus pursued reform of the a ntidumping and countervailing duty laws themselves through the Uruguay Roun d negotiations. The success of this two-track approach in constraining U.S. contingent protection provides encouragement for states now considering fr ee trade agreements with the United Stares. This Note examines the effectiv eness of Canada's two-track program and argues that, while such an approach produced significant benefits for Canada, the reform of the WTO dispute se ttlement mechanism and its substantive trade remedy disciplines during the Uruguay Round will render the approach less beneficial for states negotiati ng with the United States in the post-Uruguay Round world.