In this paper we discuss an objection to human cloning which appeals to the
welfare of the child. This objection varies according to the sort of harm
it is expected the clone will suffer. The three formulations of it that we
will consider are:
1. Clones will be harmed by the fearful or prejudicial attitudes people may
have about or towards them(H1);
2. Clones will be harmed bl the demands and expectations of parents or geno
type donors (H2)I
3. Clones will be harmed by their own awareness of their origins,for exampl
e the knowledge that the genetic donor is a stranger (H3).
We will show why, these three versions of the child welfare objection do no
t necessarily, supply compelling reasons to ban human reproductive cloning.
The claim that toe will develop and defend in the course of our discussion
is that even if it is the case that a cloned child will suffer harms of th
e type H1-H3, it is none the less permissible to conceive bn, cloning so lo
ng as these cloning-induced welfare deficits are lot such as to blight the
existence of the resultant child, whoever this may be.