To understand why Congress is prompted to react to Supreme Court feder
al statutory construction decisions, we examine two different explanat
ions of this phenomenon. The first focuses on the role that political
actors, such as the president, the public, and interest groups, and sa
lient issues play in the legislative process. The second explanation i
s based on the work of scholars who argue that ideological differences
between the Supreme Court and Congress are important in provoking leg
islative reactions to Court rulings. The results of our analysis indic
ate that public opinion, salient cases, and Court invitations to Congr
ess to revise its rulings are statistically significant predictors of
some minimal level of congressional reaction, whereas the position of
the president and partisan control of government help determine when t
he Congress is able to pass decision modification legislation. Ideolog
ical differences between the High Court and congressional committees a
nd the full chambers are generally statistically insignificant factors
.