AN EMPIRICAL-COMPARISON OF PROBABILISTIC COALITION STRUCTURE THEORIESIN 3-PERSON SIDEPAYMENT GAMES

This article reports a comparative test of the central-union theory vi s-a-vis several other game-theoretic solution concepts in 3-person sid epayment games. Based on a laboratory experiment, this comparison util izes nine games in characteristic function form. The solution concepts under test include the equal excess model, the Myerson-Shapley soluti on, the kernel, and two variants of the central-union theory (CU-1 and CU-2). With regard to the player's payoffs, results show that the CU- 1, CU-2, kernel, and equal excess theories have essentially equal pred ictive accuracy and that all of these are more accurate than Myerson-S hapley. When the solution concepts are extended and coalition structur e probability predictions are incorporated in the test, one version of the central-union theory (CU-2) is overall more accurate than the oth er solutions.