In this Response, Professor Alien contends that in arguing that plaint
iffs in state court proceedings are unable to fairly and effectively b
argain for the release of exclusively federal claims, the court in Mat
sushita II reached a judgment that is inconsistent with established co
ncepts of finality of judgments, with design of an effective class act
ion mechanism, and with the policies and precedents of full faith and
credit. Although the centrality of the federalism idea has waxed and w
aned, the Supreme Court has generally encouraged respect by the lower
federal courts of the processes and judgments of state courts. The exi
sting system of decentralized state and federal courts allowed for the
development of the Delaware Court of Chancery as a de facto specializ
ed court of fiduciary and business law, which has been a positive forc
e in the economy. The Matsushita II court, by contrast, does not accor
d respect to state court determinations of adequacy under Rule 23 and
thus potentially reinvents the problem of inefficiency and second-gues
sing that is solved by the rule of finality and recognition of judgmen
ts. Commentators favoring Matsushita II's disregard for state court ju
dgments erroneously believe that state court judges possess less integ
rity than their federal counterparts. A litigant is entitled to only a
conscientious judicial determination of the issues according to law i
n a proceeding that meets constitutional minimums-a task that state co
urts are ably equipped to handle and that federal coupe should not lig
htly disturb.