A steadily growing literature has emerged in recent years on the role
of analogical reasoning in policymaking contexts. However, there has s
o far been little attempt to anwer the question of where and when anal
ogical reasoning tends to be used. Using Yaacov Vertzberger's 'situati
onal-motivational nexus' framework as starting point, the article exam
ines the decision of the Kennedy administration to wait it out during
the substantial stock market crash of 1962. Little evidence is uncover
ed that the Kennedy and his advisers relied on analogical reasoning to
reach this decision, a finding which is surprising given the number o
f situational and motivational inducements present in the case. The ar
ticle concludes that a high degree of perceived risk and uncertainty -
noticeably absent from the stock market case - is the key situational
inducement to analogizing, but suggests that the case tells us someth
ing important about the prevalence of rule- as opposed to case-based r
easoning.