A THEORY OF CONTRACT AND OWNERSHIP CHOICE IN PUBLIC-ENTERPRISES UNDERREFORMED SOCIALISM - THE CASE OF CHINA TVES

Authors
ZHU T
Citation
T. Zhu, A THEORY OF CONTRACT AND OWNERSHIP CHOICE IN PUBLIC-ENTERPRISES UNDERREFORMED SOCIALISM - THE CASE OF CHINA TVES, China economic review, 9(1), 1998, pp. 59-71
Citations number
24
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
China economic review → ACNP
ISSN journal
1043951X
Volume
9
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Pages
59 - 71
Database
ISI
SICI code
1043-951X(1998)9:1<59:ATOCAO>2.0.ZU;2-W
Abstract
We construct a formal model on the general lines of the rent-seeking t heory to explain the pattern of contractual and ownership arrangements and its evolution in China's township and village enterprises. We sho w that because local government officials are not the residual claiman ts of TVEs and are corruptible, they may have incentives to make ineff icient choices. But market competition will force them increasingly to adopt efficient arrangements JEL Classification Numbers: P26, P31, D2 3, and L32.