ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIONAL SPACETIME - FOR BETTER OR WORSE, THE DEBATE GOES ON

Authors
Citation
C. Hoefer, ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIONAL SPACETIME - FOR BETTER OR WORSE, THE DEBATE GOES ON, British journal for the philosophy of science, 49(3), 1998, pp. 451-467
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
History & Philosophy of Sciences","History & Philosophy of Sciences","History & Philosophy of Sciences
ISSN journal
00070882
Volume
49
Issue
3
Year of publication
1998
Pages
451 - 467
Database
ISI
SICI code
0007-0882(1998)49:3<451:AVRS-F>2.0.ZU;2-H
Abstract
The traditional absolutist-relationist debate is still clearly formula ble in the context of General Relativity Theory (GTR), despite the imp ortant differences between Einstein's theory and the earlier context o f Newtonian physics. This paper answers recent arguments by Robert Ryn asiewicz against the significance of the debate in the GTR context. In his [1996] ('Absolute vs. Relational Spacetime: An Outmoded Debate?') ,Rynasiewicz argues that already in the late nineteenth century, and e ven more so in the context of General Relativity theory, the terms of the original Descartes-Newton-Leibniz dispute about space are not to b e found. Nineteenth-century ether theories of electromagnetism, and th e metric field of GTR, he claims, do not lend themselves to being inte rpreted clearly as either absolute space a la Newton, or relational st ructures a la either Descartes or Leibniz. I argue that, while in some imaginable theories Rynasiewicz's claim that the classical debate dis solves would be correct, in fact in the most important historical theo ries he discusses, this is not the case. In particular, I argue that i n both Lorentz's ether theory and General Relativity theory, there is a clear and compelling way to establish connections to the classical a bsolutist-relationist disputes, and that in both these theories it is the absolutist position that is prima facie victorious. To support my arguments and give a clear overview of the whole debate, I end by offe ring definitional sketches of relationism and absolutism (substantival ism) about spacetime in the context of contemporary physics. The sketc hes show the clear connections between these views today and their anc estors in Newton and Leibniz. But at the same time, they indicate how both views are not just claims about existing physical theories, but r ather also bets about how future physics will clarify the ontological picture.