Moral particularism in the light of deontic logic

Authors
Citation
X.parent, Moral particularism in the light of deontic logic, Artificial intelligence and law , 19(2-3), 2011, pp. 75-98
ISSN journal
09248463
Volume
19
Issue
2-3
Year of publication
2011
Pages
75 - 98
Database
ACNP
SICI code
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to strengthen the point made by Horty about the relationship between reason holism and moral particularism. In the literature prima facie obligations have been considered as the only source of reason holism. I strengthen Horty s point in two ways. First, I show that contrary-to-duties provide another independent support for reason holism. Next I outline a formal theory that is able to capture these two sources of holism. While in simple settings the proposed account coincides with Horty s one, this is not true in more complicated or realistic settings in which more than two norms collide. My chosen formalism is so-called input/output logic. A bottom-line example is introduced. It raises the issue of whether the conventional wisdom is right in assuming that normative reasons run parallel to epistemic ones.