TOWARD A NEW TEST FOR THE INSANITY DEFENSE - INCORPORATING THE DISCOVERIES OF NEUROSCIENCE INTO MORAL AND LEGAL THEORIES

Lawbreakers whose cognitive abilities appear unimpaired sometimes comm it crimes despite knowing or appreciating the wrongfulness of their ac tions. Traditional theorists have argued that these individuals delibe rately chose to act criminally and should be punished accordingly. Rec ently, findings from the empirical sciences, however, suggest that in a subset of these offenders, the emotional and biological cues that no rmally guide behavior are absent, thus depriving the affected individu als of the capability for rational choice and-by extension-moral agenc y. In these cases, criminal punishment is unwarranted. In this Comment , Laura Reider draws upon discoveries in the field of neucroscience to challenge the assumptions underlying current versions of the insanity defense. She argues that offenders with sufficiently impaired emotion al systems should not be held responsible as moral agents in the crimi nal justice system. Toward that end, this Comment traces the evolution of the insanity defense and criticizes its various formulations in li ght of data from the brain sciences. In conclusion, this Comment artic ulates a broader version of the insanity defense, one that is consonan t with the human capacity for rational behavior as measured in scienti fic terms, and then assesses its ramifications.