Geographic compactness standards have been offered as neutral and effe
ctive standards constraining redistricting. In this paper, we test thi
s allegation. Redistricting is treated as a combinatoric optimization
problem that is constrained by compactness rules. Computer models are
used to analyze the results of applying compactness standards when pol
itical groups are geographically concentrated. Several population mode
ls are used to generate populations of voters, and arbitrary plans are
created with combinatoric optimization algorithms. We find that compa
ctness standards can be used to limit gerrymandering, but only if such
standards require severe compactness. Compactness standards are not p
olitically neutral-a geographically concentrated minority party will b
e affected by com pactness standards much differently than a party sup
ported by a geographically diffuse population. The particular effects
of compactness standards depend on the institutional mechanism that cr
eates districts. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.