VALUES, ACTS, AND ACTORS - DISTINGUISHING GENERIC AND DISCRIMINATORY INTOLERANCE

Where tolerance is defined as a person's willingness to put up with po litical expression that the person finds objectionable, we see three p rerequisites for tolerance. The person must support the general right of political expression, the general right of people to engage in the particular acts under consideration, and finally the right of members of even objectionable groups to engage in those specific acts. Many pa st studies of tolerance proceed directly from the first of these prere quisites to the third, and, in doing so, fail to distinguish between g eneral attitudes regarding particular acts of expression (i.e., does t he survey respondent support the right of people in general to hold pu blic rallies) and attitudes regarding particular groups engaged in tho se same acts (i.e., does the respondent support the right of Communist s or militia groups to hold public rallies). The consequence is ambigu ity in interpretation of the meaning and etiology of tolerance, and in cross-national comparison. We demonstrate our concerns using data fro m a split-ballot survey conducted in Romania. Results reveal that accu rate interpretation of Romanians' tolerance of the right of ethnic Hun garians to engage in various acts of political expression requires att ention to respondents' general attitudes regarding those same acts.