CRISIS ESCALATION - AN EMPIRICAL-TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE

The effort to explain escalation processes using formal and empirical models has yielded numerous insights. However, there have been relativ ely few attempts to integrate these two approaches such that the resul ts from an empirical test of escalation behavior are interpreted withi n and based on a well specified theory of escalation. This paper bridg es that gap by developing a formal theory of escalation processes to d erive hypotheses that identify the conditions under which states escal ate in conflict. A player's decision to escalate or back down is based on an estimate of the opponent's cost tolerance-the maximum costs a p layer will withstand to achieve a demand in the game. The hypotheses d erived from the theory are general and applicable in many contexts tha t involve escalation processes. In this paper, the hypotheses are test ed empirically in the context of extended deterrence crises. The test confirms the theory's expectations and reveals strong support for the hypotheses. The theory offered here, I argue, provides a better explan ation for the patterns found in the data than do the theories used in previous studies of extended deterrence.