The 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard was established b
y the Norwegian government in 1977 and has been an issue of internatio
nal dispute ever since. The disagreement is rooted in different interp
retations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty and has led Norway to choose a g
entle enforcement of fishery regulations in the area. In practice, thi
s has implied that violators in the Svalbard Zone are not punished. Vi
olation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard nevertheless reveal
a high degree of compliance by fishermen. The main question of the pre
sent article is how this compliance can be explained. It is apparently
problematic to account for it through a traditional coercion-based ap
proach since the threat of sanctions is absent. It is suggested that a
ctual compliance is the result of such various factors as legitimacy,
discursive measures, ''indirect coercion'' or ''creeping compliance,''
diplomatic negotiations, and sometimes also a lack of incentive on th
e part of fishermen to violate the rules.