WHY GODEL THEOREM CANNOT REFUTE COMPUTATIONALISM

Citation
G. Laforte et al., WHY GODEL THEOREM CANNOT REFUTE COMPUTATIONALISM, Artificial intelligence, 104(1-2), 1998, pp. 265-286
Citations number
10
Categorie Soggetti
Computer Science Artificial Intelligence","Computer Science Artificial Intelligence
Journal title
ISSN journal
00043702
Volume
104
Issue
1-2
Year of publication
1998
Pages
265 - 286
Database
ISI
SICI code
0004-3702(1998)104:1-2<265:WGTCRC>2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
Godel's theorem is consistent with the computationalist hypothesis. Ro ger Penrose, however, claims to prove that Godel's theorem implies tha t human thought cannot be mechanized. We review his arguments and show how they are flawed. Penrose's arguments depend crucially on ambiguit ies between precise and imprecise senses of key terms. We show that th ese ambiguities cause the Godel/Turing diagonalization argument to lea d from apparently intuitive claims about human abilities to paradoxica l or highly idiosyncratic conclusions, and conclude that any similar a rgument will also fail in the same ways. (C) 1998 Published by Elsevie r B.V. All rights reserved.