Judges in the nineteenth-centnry South repeatedly held that race was a
matter of ''fact,'' not ''law,'' something best left to juries, who r
epresented community consensus. Yet in a variety of disputes in ninete
enth-century courts in which a person's racial status was on trial, fr
om slaves' suits for freedom to inheritance battles, judges discovered
that legal determinations of race could nor reflect community consens
us because there was no consensus to reflect. This Article examines th
e kinds of evidence witnesses and litigants brought forth at trial and
argues that law broadly defined played an important role in constitut
ing the cultural meaning of racial identities. Using a variety of loca
l manuscript sources, the Article demonstrates that law became parr of
the definition of race in two related ways. First, law made the ''per
formance'' of whiteness especially important among the variety of type
s of evidence litigants presented at trial. Doing the things a white m
an or woman did became the law's working definition of whiteness. Seco
nd one of the most important wars in which men in particular could per
form whiteness was, paradoxically through the exercise of legal rights
. Witnesses at trial frequently proved a person's whiteness by reporti
ng on his performance of acts of citizenship-voting, mustering for the
militia, sitting on a jury-that made rightsholding part of the defini
tion of whiteness. The trials reveal the implications of a racial ideo
logy that decreed that ''negro blood'' made a person inferior in virtu
e, competency and behavior-that ''blood'' made a person act in certain
ways. The ''laws'' of race could be subverted by people who followed
all the rules of whiteness but ''hid'' their intrinsic blackness. Law,
which provided the forum for these challenges, made a discourse of ra
ce as performance especially salient.