This paper addresses the issue of philosophy of names within the conte
xt of biological taxonomy, more specifically how names refer. By contr
asting two philosophies of names, one that is based on the idea that n
ames can be defined and one that they cannot be defined, I point out s
ome advantages of the latter within phylogenetic systematics. Due to t
he changing nature of phylogenetic hypotheses, the former approach len
ds to rob taxonomy from its unique communicative value since a name th
at is defined refers to whatever fits the definition. This is particul
arly troublesome should the hypothesis of phylogenetic relationship ch
ange. I argue that, should we decide to accept a new phylogenetic hypo
thesis, it is also likely that our view of what to name may change. A
system where names only refer acknowledge this, and accordingly leaves
it open whether to keep a name land accept the way it refers in the n
ew hypothesis) or discard a name and introduce new names for the parts
of the tree that we find scientifically interesting. One of the main
differences between a phylogenetic system of definition (PSD) and a ph
ylogenetic system of reference (PSR) is that the former is governed by
laws of language while the latter by communicative needs of taxonomis
ts. Thus, a PSR tends to give primacy to phylogenetic trees rather tha
n phylogenetic definitions of names should our views of which phylogen
etic hypothesis to accept change. (C) 1998 The Norwegian Academy of Sc
iences and Letters.