THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS - CONTINGENCY AND RELEVANCE

In this essay, T proceed by, first, laying out H. Tristram Engelhardt' s argument for the principle of permission as the proper foundation fo r a secular bioethic. After considering how a number of commentators h ave tried to undermine this argument, I show why it is immune to some of these advances. I then offer my own critique of Engelhardt's projec t. This critique is two pronged. First, I argue that Engelhardt is una ble to establish his own foundation for a secular bioethic. This inabi lity leaves him with only contingent points of departure for a secular bioethic, some of the more salient of which he has ignored. Second, I argue that even if Engelhardt's project succeeds, it is in danger of being irrelevant in a practical sense because it ignores important con textual dimensions of the peculiar enterprise we call bioethics. Ultim ately, the proper foundations for a relevant secular bioethic, I argue , must appeal to certain contingent features of the: context that give s rise to the need for it.