PRIMARY ELECTION SYSTEMS AND REPRESENTATION

We examine how differences in the institutions that regulate candidate nomination procedures, specifically direct primary election laws, aff ect the types of candidates elected in nonpresidential American electi ons. We hypothesize that in more closed primary systems, control over candidate nominations by ideological extremists will translate into a higher likelihood that extreme candidates win in the general election. We hypothesize that in more open systems, participation by a wider sp ectrum of the electorate means that candidates must appeal to more mod erate voters, leading to the election of more moderate candidates. Usi ng pooled cross-section time-series regression analysis, we find that U.S, representatives. from states with closed primaries take policy po sitions that are furthest from their district's estimated median voter 's ideal positions. Representatives from states with semi-closed prima ries are the most moderate. We conclude that the costs of strategic be havior created by electoral institutions have important consequences f or electoral outcomes.