ELIMINATIVISM AND THE AMBIGUITY OF BELIEF

It has recently been claimed(1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, s ubject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key t erms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues tha t there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the elimi nativist, and in this sense some kinds of ''belief'' (dispositional st ates, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed ''theoretical'' and hence possible candidates for elimination, while o thers (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptual G estalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination .