U. Kamecke, DOMINANCE OR MAXIMIN - HOW TO SOLVE AN ENGLISH AUCTION, International journal of game theory, 27(3), 1998, pp. 407-426
Citations number
21
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods",Economics,"Statistic & Probability","Mathematics, Miscellaneous","Mathematics, Miscellaneous","Statistic & Probability
It is widely believed that the English auction is solved after the dom
inated strategies are eliminated. This paper demonstrates that the dom
inance criterion is not very effective in many English auction models.
To bid more than the true willingness to pay is dominated but a stron
ger solution concept is needed to deduce that the buyers increase the
price in small steps up to their valuation. An iterated application of
the dominance criterion does not solve the problem, but if it is assu
med that the buyers use their maximin strategies the usual argument ho
lds.