Ideological reorientation in China, which began in the late-1970s, was
borne out of the need to invalidate the hitherto 'standardised' and '
immutable' Soviet socialist model, and to move beyond the limitations
of classical Marxism. In emphasising subjectivity and moral-ethical in
terpretation of humanism, which was found lacking in Lenin's theory of
reflection, the post-1978 thinking undermined the centrality of class
and ultimately the party's claim and authority as a representative en
tity. Yet this intellectual reassessment failed at furnishing a new pe
rsuasively and coherently articulated ideological framework since it d
id not address the adverse long-term political and socio-economic cons
equences of economic liberalisation. The post-Tienanmen period has see
n a simultaneous emergence of neo-conservatism, a nostalgia for the Ma
o era and the receptivity to New Confucianism, as an effort to address
the loss of central authority and the consequent ideological and poli
tical fragmentation by having recourse to a blend of selective western
ideas and institutions with the traditional Chinese values. The post-
Mao change of course illustrates the 'orientational crisis' that has e
nveloped Chinese socio-economic cultural order after it can no more be
contained by an official orthodoxy.