A REVIEW OF GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF FISHING

Authors
Citation
Ur. Sumaila, A REVIEW OF GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF FISHING, Marine policy, 23(1), 1999, pp. 1-10
Citations number
86
Categorie Soggetti
Environmental Studies","International Relations
Journal title
ISSN journal
0308597X
Volume
23
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
1 - 10
Database
ISI
SICI code
0308-597X(1999)23:1<1:AROGMO>2.0.ZU;2-T
Abstract
Game theory is a formal tool for analysing strategic interaction betwe en a finite number of agents. The fact that usually more than one enti ty or agent has property rights to fishery resources, has led to an ex plosion in the use of game theory and applications thereof to analyse fishery management problems. This review shows that game-theoretic mod elling has made significant contributions to our understanding of the problems of fishery resource management. However, many challenges stil l remain. For instance, models of straddling stocks are yet to be full y developed. In addition, fisheries economists have not yet fully expl oited the opportunity provided by computational methods now available, and the ever increasing power of computers, to develop more empirical game-theoretic models for practical fisheries management. (C) 1998 El sevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.