IS INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST POSSIBLE

This Article analyzes the economic incentives countries face in select ing an antitrust policy. It demonstrates that, in the presence of inte rnational trade, antitrust policies chosen by national governments wil l generally not lead to an outcome that is desirable from an internati onal perspective. Professor Guzman identifies the reasons why national policies are different from the optimal global policy and shows how t he direction of the deviation from the optimal policy depends on trade patterns and the extent to which national laws are applied extraterri torially. The author concludes that, although international agreement is not impossible, the prospects for substantive cooperation on intern ational antitrust policy are slight. Unlike trade policy, an internati onal agreement on antitrust policy would benefit some countries at the expense of others. The Article identifies the potential winners and l osers from such an agreement and points out that because international compensatory transfer payments are unlikely, an agreement will be dif ficult to achieve. Recognizing that agreement is nevertheless desirabl e to avoid welfare losses associated with a noncooperative approach to international antitrust policy, Professor Guzman analyzes the fora in which antitrust agreements are most likely to be negotiated and asses ses the likelihood of success in each forum. Because concessions in ot her areas of negotiation may be necessary to compensate countries that will suffer a loss under a cooperative antitrust policy, the analysis suggests that negotiations on antitrust policy should be combined wit h the negotiations of other issues.