The vast majority of social constructionist writings have been critica
l of psychological science-on both ideological and conceptual grounds.
The constructionist emphasis on microsocial processes also functions
oppositionally to psychological accounting. The existing animus grows,
however, from a realist metaphysics and a correspondence view of lang
uage, neither of which constructionism endorses. Viewing the relations
hip between constructionism and psychological science in more pragmati
c terms, we find three significant ways in which constructionism contr
ibutes to a more fully enriched and broadly effective psychology. Firs
t, critical constructionism functions to denaturalize psychological ac
counts, opening them to reflexive deliberation, and democratizing the
field more generally. Second, constructionist metatheory invites a res
uscitation of marginal or suppressed discourse within the field, and i
nvigorates societally engaged efforts to forge new and more useful dis
courses of the mind. Finally, social constructionism offers the possib
ility for a fundamental reconceptualization of the self. Illustrative
is the family of theories conceptualizing the self as either constitut
ed by or constituting relationships.