Discretion and politicization in EU competition policy: The case of mergercontrol

In a world where goods and services (but also people, capital and ideas) ar e increasingly ignoring national borders, competition policy has emerged as a highly salient issue at the heart of international trade discussions. As pects of competition policy, from cartels and monopolies to state aids and the liberalization of the utilities, have become a regular feature in the p ages of the financial and legal press and have become identified as a centr al element in any government's policy towards industry and its drive for co mpetitiveness. This article focuses on European Union merger control and al though appreciative of the dominance of economics and law in competition po licy, stresses the political dimension to competition policy. A government and public administration perspective is essential. This is in evidence in the type of regime, the commitment to enforcing the law the role of discret ion and issues such as transparency and democracy. The example of merger co ntrol is used to illustrate how the European Commission (EC) has emerged an d operates as a genuinely federal actor in determining and shaping merger p olicy throughout the EU. In short, this article accounts for policy develop ment, the decision making process and in particular the degree to which dis cretion and politicization underpin one of the most crucial aspects of econ omic regulation.