Reasoners resist even the valid inferences, such as If Lisa met her friend
then she went to a play, Lisa met her friend, therefore she went to a play,
when they are given an additional condition, e.g., If Lisa had enough mone
y then she went to a play. Four experiments test alternative accounts of th
is suppression effect. The first experiment shows that inferences are suppr
essed even when reasoners produce their own conclusions, based on the first
or second conditional. The second experiment shows that suppression occurs
even when the premises are expanded to rule out the converse. The third ex
periment shows that inferences are suppressed more when the background cond
itions are expressed in a biconditional. The fourth experiment shows that b
oth valid and fallacious inferences can be suppressed when the premises ref
er to alternatives as well as to additional conditions. We suggest that sup
pression rests on the availability of counterexamples. (C) 1999 Academic Pr
ess.