An identified systemic model of the democracy-peace nexus

Citation
P. James et al., An identified systemic model of the democracy-peace nexus, DEF PEACE E, 10(1), 1999, pp. 1-37
Citations number
76
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS
ISSN journal
10242694 → ACNP
Volume
10
Issue
1
Year of publication
1999
Pages
1 - 37
Database
ISI
SICI code
1024-2694(1999)10:1<1:AISMOT>2.0.ZU;2-T
Abstract
In previous empirical work, the basis for the proposition that democratic c ountries do not fight each other has been a single equation regression of h ostility on democracy and other variables. This approach is misleading for two reasons. First, peace and democracy are part of a simultaneous system o f relations in which they foster each other. Before quantitative inferences which affect policy conclusions can be reached, a separate structural equa tion has to be estimated corresponding to each of these variables. The equa tions must be distinguishable from one another at the same time as they emb ody the interdependence between peace and democracy. Second, previous regre ssion studies emphasized the statistical association between democracy and peace rather than focusing on the substantive magnitude of that effect. To demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to these concerns, we accepted t he data and indexes of one of the most influential statements of the peace- democracy thesis, and studied the Cold War period where it is deemed strong est. We differed from the prevailing paradigm by estimating an identified, simultaneous two-equation interactive system. In this more properly specifi ed model, the dyadic democracy-peace nexus generally was not statistically significant and, more important, was very small in its impact. The alternat ive, peace causing democracy, was much stronger. Neither equation in the si multaneous system explained more than six per cent of the variance, so that other factors are likely to be much more important. Deterrence of aggressi on and patient negotiation of differences may be a more important guide to public policy than attempts to export western, democratic institutions to o ther nations. The analysis of these data show that it is more likely that the most import ant differences that arise between nations are specific to historic epochs and their political and socio-economic conjunctures. Various other indices have been suggested for conflict and democracy in the literature. as well a s numerous modifications of the additional variables to be included in the regression equations. The results have tended to be variable with respect t o these modifications, but the failure of single equation model specificati ons to deal with the problem of simultaneous causation makes their results subject to our fundamental methodological criticism and unable to support t he burden of policy recommendations.