A variety of casual evidence has been offered in measurement of the efficie
ncies, and inefficiencies, thought to flow from the Bell System divestiture
and accompanying state regulatory reforms, To address several questions in
this regard we estimate a regulated cost function for local exchange servi
ces using panel data on the divested Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). Dives
titure and regulatory reform are found to have produced significant efficie
ncies, as of 1993 saving about 20 percent in cost relative to what would ha
ve obtained in the absence of these events. More specifically, to 1993 the
divestiture yielded savings of $115.4 billion and state-level regulatory re
form yielded a slightly smaller $96.7 billion in savings (both measured in
1993 dollars). Output augmentation, factor bias, and allowed rate-of-return
effects contribute in identified ways to these overall results.