For logical and normative reasons, attributions have to follow, the covaria
tion rule. However, little is known about the cognitive process by which th
e covariation of an effect with multiple causes is extracted from empirical
observations. Previous research used verbal quantifiers to manipulate cova
riation with subjects (consensus), objects (distinctiveness), and time (con
sistency). In contrast, the inductive assessment of covariation from a sequ
ence of observations was the focus of the present experiments. Empirical fi
ndings demonstrate that accurate covariation judgment is usually confined t
o one focused factor. The role of the focal factor is augmented rather than
discounted when another covarying factor is presents. When attributers can
actively search for information, memory for singular observations is stron
g, but attributional judgments deteriorate. Experimental search strategies
improve event memory but interfere with covariation-based judgments. A unid
imensional joint scale model provides a better account of underlying cognit
ive processes than the common factorial-design model.