For-profit corporations that perform public functions: Politics, profit, and poverty

In this Article, Professor Wade argues that the corporate law shareholder-p rimacy paradigm fails to adequately account for individuals who depend upon for-profit corporations for the educational, medical, correctional, and so cial services traditionally provided by government. These for-profit corpor ations, termed "Public Function Companies" by Professor Wade, have two dist inct constituencies: shareholders who expect wealth maximization to guide c orporate action and "Corporate Dependents" who rely upon the essential serv ices administered by these corporations. Because corporate late generally r equires officers and directors to act only in, the interest of shareholders , Corporate Dependents may be left with inadequate services and no mechanis m to influence corporate action. Professor Wade posits that when the needs of Corporate Dependents conflict with shareholders' desire for wealth maxim ization, Corporate Dependents should replace shareholders as the paramount beneficiaries of Public Function Company action.