Fiscal adjustment is an illusion when it lowers the budget deficit or publi
c debt but leaves government net worth unchanged. Conventional measures of
the budget deficit largely show the change in public sector debt. Ideally,
the measured deficit would reflect the change in Public sector net worth. M
any people consider it impractical to try to measure public sector assets.
My paper does not discuss what the deficit should measure, but instead prop
oses a positive and testable theory of how governments actually behave.
When an outside agent forces a reduction in a government's conventional def
icit and debt accumulation, the government responds by lowering asset accum
ulation or increasing hidden liabilities. Since government net worth is unc
hanged, such fiscal adjustment is an illusion. Using data from countries wi
th World Bank and IMF fiscal adjustment programmes, and case studies of EMU
countries' compliance with the Maastricht criteria, I confirm my theoretic
al predictions: fiscal adjustment in these countries was at least partly an
illusion.