Km. Davis, Rape, resurrection, and the quest for truth: The law and science of rape trauma syndrome in constitutional balance with the rights of the accused, HAST LAW J, 49(5-6), 1998, pp. 1511
Over the last several years, expert testimony concerning rape trauma syndro
me has been widely employed by prosecutors to refute a defense of consent a
sserted by the accused in rape trials. Recognizing the probative value of s
yndrome evidence, some courts have concluded that when the state relies on
rape trauma syndrome to resolve issues of consent, principles of fundamenta
l fairness require that the accused be permitted to defend with the same ev
idence; However, when the accused is permitted to use rape trauma syndrome
offensively, the social science intended to benefit victims of rape may be
used to justify the resurrection of compelled psychological examinations an
d searching inquiry into a woman's sexual past. Liberal admissibility of ra
pe trauma syndrome proffered by the accused substantially undermines core v
alues embodied in protective rape shield laws-laws designed to protect vict
ims from the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment, and sexual stere
otyping endured by women who publicly prosecute rape. However, the author a
rgues that allowing unlimited prosecutorial use of syndrome evidence while
categorically precluding defendants access to the same social science is fu
ndamentally unfair and unconstitutionally deprives those accused of rage th
e right to present a complete defense. In proposing a principled framework
of admissibility, the author considers the social science supporting syndro
me research, while balancing legitimately protected privacy interests of ra
pe victims against the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused.