Strategic mating with homotypic preferences

We determine equilibrium acceptance strategies in a class of multi-period m ating games where individuals prefer opposite sex partners with a close par ameter type (one-dimensional homotypic preferences). In each period unmated individuals are randomly paired. They form a couple (and leave the pool) i f each accepts the other; otherwise they continue into future periods. We c onsider models with a fixed cohort group (without replacement) and also ste ady-state models (with replacement). Unlike the job-search model of McNamar a & Collins involving type preferences (maximizing individuals), we find no segmentation of the populations at equilibrium, rather continuous changes of strategy. We find some similarities and some differences with the Kalick -Hamilton simulation model of attractiveness matching in a dating context. In general, we find that at equilibrium all individuals become less choosy (in accepting potential mates) with time, and that individuals with more ce ntral types are choosier than those with more extreme types. (C) 1999 Acade mic Press.