Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to
a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must r
epresent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined o
bjects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinat
ing information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinemat
ic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric inform
ation in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transf
ormations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resi
stance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for ex
ample, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem,
dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical pr
operties (e.g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through i
magery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog
of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model
that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge thr
ough imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly
. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influ
ence physical imagery. (C) 1999 Academic Press.