Physical imagery: Kinematic versus dynamic models

Authors
Citation
Dl. Schwartz, Physical imagery: Kinematic versus dynamic models, COG PSYCHOL, 38(3), 1999, pp. 433-464
Citations number
65
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN journal
00100285 → ACNP
Volume
38
Issue
3
Year of publication
1999
Pages
433 - 464
Database
ISI
SICI code
0010-0285(199905)38:3<433:PIKVDM>2.0.ZU;2-H
Abstract
Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must r epresent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined o bjects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinat ing information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinemat ic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric inform ation in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transf ormations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resi stance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for ex ample, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical pr operties (e.g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through i magery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge thr ough imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly . It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influ ence physical imagery. (C) 1999 Academic Press.