R. Schwager, The theory of administrative federalism: An alternative to fiscal centralization and decentralization, PUBL FIN R, 27(3), 1999, pp. 282-309
Under administrative federalism, the central state sets quality standards f
or public projects and the local jurisdictions decide which projects are ca
rried our. Decentralized decisions suffer from an interjurisdictional spill
over: The central stare cannot distinguish between useful and useless proje
cts, It is shown that administrative federalism is always preferable to dec
entralization. This is due to die distinction between the net benefit of in
creasing the qualify level for all projects and the net benefit of carrying
out an additional project. If the information problem is sufficiently impo
rtant, administrative federalism also is preferable to centralization Final
ly, it may even implement the first best solution.