The theory of administrative federalism: An alternative to fiscal centralization and decentralization

Authors
Citation
R. Schwager, The theory of administrative federalism: An alternative to fiscal centralization and decentralization, PUBL FIN R, 27(3), 1999, pp. 282-309
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW
ISSN journal
10911421 → ACNP
Volume
27
Issue
3
Year of publication
1999
Pages
282 - 309
Database
ISI
SICI code
1091-1421(199905)27:3<282:TTOAFA>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
Under administrative federalism, the central state sets quality standards f or public projects and the local jurisdictions decide which projects are ca rried our. Decentralized decisions suffer from an interjurisdictional spill over: The central stare cannot distinguish between useful and useless proje cts, It is shown that administrative federalism is always preferable to dec entralization. This is due to die distinction between the net benefit of in creasing the qualify level for all projects and the net benefit of carrying out an additional project. If the information problem is sufficiently impo rtant, administrative federalism also is preferable to centralization Final ly, it may even implement the first best solution.