Shame, embarrassment, and formal sanction threats: Extending the deterrence rational choice model to academic dishonesty

Following the lead of Grasmick and Bursik (1990), we propose that significa nt others and conscience both function as agents of social control to deter illicit behavior in a manner similar to that provided by the law and more formal, bureaucratic organizations. All three-conscience, significant other s, and formal organizations-entail potential threats and costs (i.e., shame , embarrassment, and formal sanctions). Actors consider these potential thr eats and costs, and assess the certainty and severity of them, in deciding whether or not to engage in criminal or deviant behavior. In the research r eported here, data from a sample of undergraduate students are employed to examine the effects of perceived certainty and severity of shame, embarrass ment, and formal sanction threats of the self-reported prevalence of involv ement in a variety of forms of academic dishonesty. The results suggest rat her limited support for the deterrence/rational choice model, nearly all of which is due to the influence of conscience (shame).