Jk. Cochran et al., Shame, embarrassment, and formal sanction threats: Extending the deterrence rational choice model to academic dishonesty, SOCIOL INQ, 69(1), 1999, pp. 91-105
Following the lead of Grasmick and Bursik (1990), we propose that significa
nt others and conscience both function as agents of social control to deter
illicit behavior in a manner similar to that provided by the law and more
formal, bureaucratic organizations. All three-conscience, significant other
s, and formal organizations-entail potential threats and costs (i.e., shame
, embarrassment, and formal sanctions). Actors consider these potential thr
eats and costs, and assess the certainty and severity of them, in deciding
whether or not to engage in criminal or deviant behavior. In the research r
eported here, data from a sample of undergraduate students are employed to
examine the effects of perceived certainty and severity of shame, embarrass
ment, and formal sanction threats of the self-reported prevalence of involv
ement in a variety of forms of academic dishonesty. The results suggest rat
her limited support for the deterrence/rational choice model, nearly all of
which is due to the influence of conscience (shame).