Towards a cognitive robotics

There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion of in ternal representation. This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 199 5; Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and that (importantly) can be met by arg uing from within a general framework that accepts many of the basic premise s of the work tin new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motiva tes such scepticism in the first place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering an account (an example and something dose to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal Robust Representationalism (MR R). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about this not ion. We end (Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on o ur account, a science (e.g., robotics) may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.