I build on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem from international trade theory to
argue that profound and rapid changes in the costs and risks of internatio
nal economic exchange can significantly influence the security politics of
states. Increasing exposure to the international economy will increase the
state's difficulty of mobilizing locally abundant resources for security pu
rposes and ease the difficulty of mobilizing locally scarce resources. Decl
ining exposure reverses these effects. A preliminary survey of the five Eur
opean great powers before World War I supports the pattern of shifting econ
omic constraints predicted by the theory and further suggests that internat
ional economic expansion was an important cause of World War I. The theory
thus challenges the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace. It also
has important implications for several other areas of international relatio
ns, including the relationship between trade and military power, the relati
ve gains debate, and the dynamics of hegemonic theory.