Until recently, mixed electoral systems have attracted minimal academic att
ention. Recent developments warrant reconsideration. At present no less tha
n 29 countries, totalling about one-fifth of the world's population, use mi
xed systems for elections to their first or single chamber. However, there
is no consensus in the literature as to whether mixed electoral systems are
in a category of their own. Numerous scholars use the concept but do not a
gree on what it means exactly. We propose a rigorous definition of mixed sy
stems, and argue that electoral systems should not be classified as mixed f
or the sole reason that they produce results in between those resulting fro
m plurality or majority and PR. Rather, the crucial feature of a mixed syst
em is that its mechanics involves both PR and plurality or majority. We dis
tinguish between independent and dependent combinations, the latter corresp
onding to those cases where the application of one formula depends on the o
utcome produced by the other formula. We identify five basic types of hybri
ds: superposition (now exemplified by Japan), correction (Germany), coexist
ence (French Senate), fusion (French municipal elections) and conditional (
the 1923 and 1953 Italian election laws). Existing and older systems are cl
assified under those headings and their main features are described. (C) 19
99 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.