Instead of postulating the priority of literal meaning (see e.g., Grice, 19
75; Searle, 1979), the present paper adduces evidence in support of the pri
ority of salient meanings (for a similar view see Recanati, 1995). The sali
ent meaning of a word or an expression is its lexicalized meaning, i.e., th
e meaning retrievable from the mental lexicon rather than from the context
(e.g., the literal meaning of novel metaphors but not their intended, nonli
teral meaning made available by context, see Giora, 1997). Factors contribu
ting to (degrees of) lexical salience are e.g., conventionality, frequency,
and familiarity. Research into the processes involved in comprehension of
familiar and novel instances of metaphors, idioms, and irony demonstrates t
hat salient meanings enjoy a privileged status: They are always accessed, a
nd always initially, regardless of context. The findings reported here tie
up with previous findings (e.g., Swinney, 1979; Gernsbacher, 1990; Rayner e
t al., 1994) which argue against the selective access view of context. They
show that, contrary to the received view (see Gibbs, 1994, for a review),
even rich and supportive contexts which are biased in favor of less salient
meanings do not inhibit activation of salient meanings. (C) 1999 Elsevier
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