The authors investigate the effect of price and promotional restrictions on
consumer perceptions of deal value and show empirically how such evaluatio
ns can be affected adversely when deal qualifications become excessively re
strictive They examine the reasons for the pervasive use of restrictions by
marketers to limit their offers, discuss the Federal Trade Commission guid
elines that govern this practice, and develop a typology of deal restrictio
ns. The authors also propose a framework explicating the mechanism by which
consumers process restrictions in conjunction with varying deal sizes and
test its salient hypotheses through afield experiment. Results show that co
nsumers negatively evaluate restrictions that they view as causing excessiv
e inconvenience, that they perceive as misleading, and/or that lock them in
to binding commitments. In addition, such restrictive stipulations aggravat
e consumers' evaluations even when paired with relatively attractive deal o
ffers. Finally, the authors discuss several important public policy implica
tions resulting from this study and illustrate with some recent examples.