Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor

Authors
Dehez, P de la Croix, D Toulemonde, E
Citation
P. Dehez et al., Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor, J ECON, 69(2), 1999, pp. 127-139
Citations number
12
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE
ISSN journal
09318658 → ACNP
Volume
69
Issue
2
Year of publication
1999
Pages
127 - 139
Database
ISI
SICI code
0931-8658(1999)69:2<127:EBWUOL>2.0.ZU;2-N
Abstract
The standard efficient contract involving a monopolistic firm and a union h as always been derived under the assumption that the firm operates efficien tly, i.e., it fully uses its labor force. However, nothing constrains the f irm to do so and production with underutilization of labor may occur. The i mplications of ignoring that possibility and the conditions under which und erutilization effectively occurs are studied in this paper.